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Abstract Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) have become the most prevalent form
of international trade liberalization in recent decades, even though it remains far from
clear what their effects on economies and their key units, firms, are. This paper
evaluates the distributional consequences of trade liberalization within industries dif-
ferentiating two distinct aspects in which trade liberalization could result in higher trade
flows: the intensive vs. the extensive margin of trade. In particular, we analyze whether
trade liberalization leads to increased trade flows because either firms trade more
volume in products they have already traded before (intensive margin) or because they
start to trade products they have not traded previously (extensive margin), or both. We
test these arguments for the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and exporting firms based in Costa Rica for the time-
period 2008–2014. The results of our study suggest that the effects of CAFTA-DR
depend not only on whether we analyze the extensive versus the intensive margin of
trade but also whether the product in question is homogenous or differentiated and
whether the exporting firm under analysis is small or large. In particular, we find
support for the theoretical expectation that firms exporting heterogeneous products,
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such as textiles, gain from trade agreements, such as CAFTA-DR, in that they can
export more varieties of their products. Yet at the same time, they tend to lose at the
intensive margin by a reduction in their trade volume while the opposite pattern occurs
for firms exporting homogenous products.
Keywords Preferential trade agreements . Product differentiation . Extensivemargin of
trade . Intensive margin of trade
1 Introduction
Most political conflicts associated with negotiating free trade agreements concern
distributional implications. Which industries within each trading partner will benefit
from liberalization and which industries will lose? Furthermore, within specific indus-
tries not all firms might benefit equally from reducing trade barriers as more productive
and thus mostly large firms should have clear advantages when competing in foreign
markets and thus reaping the benefits attached to trade liberalization. In addition to the
question which firms gain most from trade liberalization, a hitherto unanswered
question in the context of preferential trade liberalization is whether trade agreements
mainly benefit those firms that were already able to serve foreign markets by expanding
the volume of existing trade or whether trade agreements also expand the set of
exporting firms and products?
Most existing research on trade agreements evaluates their effects on the country
level (Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Baldwin 2008; Freund and Ornelas 2010; Egger
et al. 2011). However, analyzing the effects of trade agreements on the country level
hides important sectoral respectively firm level heterogeneity. This implies that within
the same country some sectors or firms might greatly benefit from trade liberalization
while others might not (Baccini et al. 2017; Subramanian and Wei 2007). The empirical
observation that not all firms within the same industry gain equally from a change in
trade barriers (Bernard et al. 2003; Bernard and Jensen 1999; Eaton and Kortum 2002;
Eaton et al. 2004, 2011), e.g., a trade agreement, is reflected in models of new, new
trade theory (Melitz 2003). These models show that while trade liberalization typically
benefits those firms that are very productive – mostly large firms (Osgood et al. 2017)
–, less productive firms, even within the same industry, can often not compete in
foreign markets and thus cannot reap the benefits attached to trade liberalization. The
reason for this unequal effect of trade liberalization is that only the most productive
firms can compensate for the increased competition in their home market as well as the
fixed costs attached to exporting by the gains achieved through selling their products in
new markets. For the least productive firms, trade liberalization can even imply market
exit. Consequently, the implementation of trade agreements should come along with
interesting distributional effects not only within countries but also within sectors and
between firms.
One could witness such distributional conflicts among others in the context of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the US shoe industry more specifically. Whereas
Nike would have strongly welcomed the TPP agreement as the company heavily relies
on production facilities in several of the involved TPP partner countries, New Balance
on the other hand produces its shoes mainly in the US and thus feared increased
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competition using cheaper foreign production facilities (Politico 2016). Consequently,
in light of this intense political debate on the domestic distributional implications of
new trade deals a better understanding of the precise implications of such deals seems
warranted.
In addition to highlighting the distributional consequences of trade liberalization
within industries, the literature has begun to separate two distinct aspects in which trade
liberalization could result in higher trade flows: the intensive vs. the extensive margin
of trade (Chaney 2008). Correspondingly, trade liberalization could lead to increased
trade flows because either firms trade more volume in products they have already
traded before (intensive margin) or because they start to trade products they have not
traded previously (extensive margin), or both. In the context of the WTO, for example,
Dutt et al. (2013) can show that the WTO and its predecessor the GATT almost
exclusively impact the extensive margin of trade. This implies that once countries
become a member of the WTO they begin to trade products that they have previously
not traded. However, at the same time, the WTO/GATT seems to have a negative effect
on the intensive product margin, which would imply that upon membership countries
trade less volume of products that they have already traded before. Yet despite the large
theoretical literature distinguishing the extensive from the intensive margin of trade
(Chaney 2008; Helpman et al. 2008; Manova 2013), few empirical studies on this
distinction exist.1
Understanding the effects of PTAs on the firm level requires a detailed analysis of
how firm and product level trade flows react to the implementation of such an
agreement with regard to both the intensive and the extensive margin of trade. In this
paper, we focus on the effect of one specific PTA, the Dominican Republic–Central
America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)2 on firm- and product-
level trade flows. In particular, we analyze whether the set of exporters and products –
extensive margin – and the actual trade volume exported by firm respectively product
category – intensive margin – has changed due to the implementation of CAFTA-DR.
We theoretically expect that CAFTA-DR should positively affect the extensive and
intensive margin conditional on both the size of the firm and the type of product. In
general, we expect a more pronounced effect of CAFTA-DR on both margins for larger,
and thus more profitable, firms. Furthermore, we expect the effect of CAFTA-DR on
the intensive and the extensive margin to differ for differentiated versus homogenous
products. In case of homogenous goods, which are characterized by a high elasticity of
substitution, trade barriers should strongly affect the intensive margin but it should be
difficult for new firms and products to enter the market. In contrast, in case of
differentiated goods, which are products for which a lot of varieties exist and elasticity
of substitution is low, the demand for each variety should be little affected by trade
barriers (Chaney 2008). Under these circumstances the intensive margin should react
little yet we should observe a strong and positive reaction at the extensive margin of
trade.
1 Recent exceptions are Baier et al. (2014) and Kim et al. (2017).
2 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) was signed
by the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic
on August 5, 2004. In 2006, CAFTA-DR entered into force for the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua. The Dominican Republic joined in March 2007 and Costa Rica in January 2009
(US Trade Representative 2014).
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To empirically test whether and how firm and product level extensive and intensive
margins react to the implementation of CAFTA-DR, we use a novel dataset that
provides information disaggregated at the firm-product level for the years 2000 to
2014. Since all other CAFTA-DR member countries were already in a PTAwith Costa
Rica long before 2009, the year in which CAFTA-DR entered into force for Costa Rica,
we focus our analysis on how Costa Rican exports to the US market change with
entering into force of CAFTA-DR in relation to those markets for which we observe no
trade liberalization, i.e., the non-PTA markets. This empirical identification strategy is
necessary to be able to draw causal inference given our empirical setting. Simply
analyzing how trade flows of all CAFTA-DR members evolved compared to other
markets would conflate markets that have been previously liberalized with those that
only saw trade liberalization because of CAFTA-DR.
Based on this empirical strategy, we find that the overall benefits of CAFTA-DR
mainly materialize at the extensive margin. With CAFTA-DR entering into force both
the number of firms as well as the number of products exported by these firms has
increased. In contrast, our results show only few overall benefits at the intensive
margin. Yet if we condition our analysis on the type of product, we observe that in
line with our theoretical expectations the two margins of trade react in opposite
directions: Whereas the intensive margin positively reacts in case of homogenous
goods it is the extensive margin that is positively affected in case of differentiated
goods. This suggests that the benefits of CAFTA-DR mainly lie in expanding both the
set of exporting firms as well as the set of export products if we consider products for
which many varieties exists whereas for the same type of products we observe little
gains through the expansion in the volume traded. In contrast, for homogenous
products the gains from CAFTA-DR arise mainly through the expansion in volume
traded.
This paper advances the existing literature in at least two ways. First, over the last
decades more and more developing and emerging market economies have started to
negotiate PTAs, often including large advanced economies. So far, the literature has,
however, mainly focused on advanced economies when evaluating the impact of such
trade agreements. Hence we know little about the impact of PTAs on emerging market
economies. Costa Rica is a prime example of such an economy and it is crucial to
understand whether these countries benefit from PTAs in a similar manner as industri-
alized countries and how benefits within these countries are distributed.
Second, while most of the literature evaluates PTAs at the country level, our
disaggregated firm-product level data enables us to study the effects of CAFTA-DR
on the extensive versus the intensive margin both at the firm and at the product level.
Hence our study adds to a nascent empirical literature (Baier et al. 2014; Dutt et al.
2013; Kim et al. 2017) studying the hitherto mostly theoretical distinction between the
extensive and the intensive margin of trade.
Yet a better understanding of which firms benefit from trade liberalization via PTAs
and whether this occurs by expanding the set of products and the number of firms or
rather by expanding existing trade flows is important also with respect to policy
making. If the gains from PTAs mainly arose from expanding the intensive margin,
i.e., the volume of trade, those firms already exporting would be the main winners of
the agreement. However, if PTAs also create new export opportunities for firms that so
far did not have access to these foreign markets a broader set of economic actors should
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gain from these agreements. As a consequence, the set of actors potentially supporting
such agreements should vary accordingly and thus the domestic support coalition on
which governments could rely on when negotiating trade agreements should differ
depending on the strength of specific industries. Understanding the exact distributional
consequences of these agreements and thus the potential actors favoring or opposing
them seems indispensable especially in times in which PTAs have come under
increased scrutiny, as examples such as the US withdrawal from the TPP or the strong
public backlash against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in
Europe illustrate.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section we first discuss the existing literature on the effects of PTAs before
discussing some empirical regularities concerning trade flow patterns. We then present
our theoretical expectations concerning the effect of CAFTA-DR on the extensive and
intensive margin of trade.
2.1 What do we know about the effects of trade agreements on trade flows?
Do trade agreements actually lead to an increase in trade flows between their member
countries? And if so, is this because trade agreements allow new firms to start exporting
or because firms already exporting are able to export even more? The question whether
trade agreements indeed fulfill the aim that they were created for, namely, to increase
trade flows between their member countries, started in the context of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). While a first assessment of this question seemed to suggest that
neither the WTO nor its predecessor the GATT had an effect on actual trade flows
(Rose 2004), later studies point towards a more nuanced picture (Tomz et al. 2007;
Subramanian and Wei 2007). For example, Subramanian and Wei (2007) show that the
WTO promotes trade but unevenly: industrial countries that participated more actively
in trade negotiations experienced a stronger increase in trade upon membership.
Furthermore, only sectors that were indeed liberalized witnessed a significant increase
in trade flows with bilateral trade flows increasing most when both countries in the
dyad decided to liberalize.
More recently, research started to analyze whether the WTO/GATT enabled trade in
new products that were not traded previously (extensive margin) or whether it increased
trade in products already traded (intensive margin). Dutt et al. (2013) can show that the
WTO/GATT almost exclusively impacts the extensive margin of trade leading to an
increase in trade in products that have previously not been traded. However, at the same
time the WTO/GATT seems to have a negative effect on the intensive product margin,
i.e., it decreases the volume of products that countries have already traded before.
These findings suggests that while the number of products countries tend to trade when
entering into the WTO/GATT increases, the volume of products traded tend to de-
crease, which would be in line with the earlier finding of Rose (2004) that the WTO/
GATT has no discernible effect on trade volumes.
Turning from the WTO to PTAs, the literature generally shows that PTAs tend to
increase trade between their members, with small trade-diverting effects for non-
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members (Baier and Bergstrand 2004, 2007; Baldwin 2008; Baldwin and Low 2009;
Dai et al. 2014; Egger et al. 2008, 2011; Freund and Ornelas 2010; Fugazza and
Nicita 2013; Magee 2008). More recently, studies have begun to evaluate whether
PTAs demanding deep integration lead to more trade-creation and less trade-
diversion relationship than more shallow integration (e.g., Baier et al. 2014;
Mattoo et al. 2017). Differentiating between the extensive and the intensive
margin at the country level, Baier et al. (2014) for example, find that deep agree-
ments have a stronger impact on both the intensive and the extensive margin than
more shallow agreements. Some studies go beyond the pure trade effects of PTAs
and analyze how PTAs affect other macro economic indicators such as employment
and country level welfare (Arkolakis et al. 2012; Egger and Larch 2011; Romalis
2007; Trefler 2004). However, while most of this research shows that PTAs tend to
increase trade between member countries, these studies tend to evaluate the effect of
PTAs on the country level. One recent exception is the study of Baccini et al. (2017),
which analyzes the effect of US PTAs on US multinationals. In line with the
predictions of recent trade models, which are discussed in the following section,
their results suggest that the gains from preferential trade are very unevenly distrib-
uted with more competitive firms gaining most.
Consequently, while it is clearly important to understand whether trade agreements
benefit their member countries as a whole, new research on international trade flows
suggest that any analysis on the country level might hide important variation since most
action in international trade does not occur on the country or even industry but rather on
the firm level. Moreover, the distinction between trade effects on the intensive versus
the extensive margin as introduced in the context of the WTO (Dutt et al. 2013)
provides an additional layer of complexity that should allow for a more precise
understanding of the actual impact of preferential trade agreements.
2.2 Empirical patterns for firms and trade
While standard models of trade – i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin vs. Ricardo-Viner – come to
different conclusions as to who benefits from trade liberalization, they have in common
that they treat firms within industries as identical and products within industries as
homogeneous. Yet recent empirical studies have found some regularities in trade flow
patterns that are hard to align with the assumptions of these standard models. In
particular, these empirical regularities suggest that firms who export differ from firms
producing for their home market, independent of the sector in which they are operating.
Exporters tend to be larger in size and are much more productive (Aw et al. 1998;
Bernard et al. 2003; Bernard and Jensen 1999; Eaton and Kortum 2002; Eaton et al.
2004, 2011). Furthermore, a minority of firms export and those that export typically
only serve one or few markets (Eaton et al. 2004).
Melitz (2003) introduced a theoretical model to account for the observed heteroge-
neity of firms within industries. In this model trade liberalization typically benefits
those firms that already export and that are most productive whereas it tends to harm
non-exporting firms and those that are least productive. The reason for this unequal
effect of trade liberalization is that only the most productive firms can offset the
increased competition in their home market by higher levels of exports. For the least
productive firms, trade liberalization can even imply market exit.
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Furthermore, Chaney (2008) distinguishes the effect of a change in trade barriers on
the extensive vs. the intensive margin, where the extensive margin is the set of
exporters, i.e., how many firms export, and the intensive margin is the size of exports
by firms. If trade barriers change both extensive and intensive margin could change,
i.e., less firms could export and they could change the quantity of goods exported.
Chaney (2008) shows that the effect of a change in trade barriers depends on the
elasticity of substitution: if elasticity is high the intensive margin reacts more strongly
than the extensive margin to a change in trade barriers.
While there exist an emerging literature in political science evaluating the implica-
tions of firm level heterogeneity on trade preferences and trade policy lobbying (Plouffe
2017; Jensen et al. 2015; Kim 2017; Osgood 2017; Osgood et al. 2017), few empirical
studies evaluate the effect of PTAs on the firm or even product level.3 For example,
Baggs and Brander (2006), relying on firm level data to estimate the effect of the
Canada-US free trade agreement on Canadian firms’ profits, find, using a sample of all
Canadian companies paying taxes, that decreases in domestic tariffs are associated with
lower profits for import-competing firms. In contrast, decreases in foreign tariffs are
associated with higher profits for exporting firms. Following a different approach,
Moser and Rose (2014) evaluate the effect of PTAs on firms using stock market data.
However, while relying on firm level data, they aggregate their analysis on the country
level to be able to estimate the effect of PTAs on countries’ overall welfare. Finally,
Baccini et al. (2017) evaluate the effect of US PTAs on the sales of affiliates of US
firms to the US market. They can show that the largest and most competitive firms can
reap disproportionally high gains from these agreements supporting the idea of uneven
benefits of PTAs.
In summary, the literature on trade patterns focusing on the firm level is developing
rapidly and produces important insights on how firms that export differ from those that
do not. However, few studies, with the exception of Baccini et al. (2017) and Baggs and
Brander (2006), analyze how PTAs affect trade flows at the firm level. Furthermore, the
differentiation between the effect of trade liberalization for the intensive vs. the
extensive margin of trade, which has been studied in the context of the WTO (Dutt
et al. 2013) and in the context of PTAs (Baier et al. 2014), has, to the best of our
knowledge, not been applied to firm level data. Our study of how CAFTA-DR affects
the extensive and the intensive margin of trade at the firm and product level intends to
fill these gaps.
2.3 The effect of CAFTA-DR on trade flows – theoretical expectations
Building on the idea of firm level heterogeneity, we study the effect of one specific
preferential trade agreement, namely CAFTA-DR, on the extensive vs. the intensive
margin of trade (Chaney 2008), both at the firm and at the product level. On the firm
level, the extensive margin indicates the set of firms exporting per year, i.e., how many
firms export, while the intensive margin refers to the size of exports by firm and year.
On the product level, the extensive margin indicates the number of different products
exported by firm and year and the intensive margin the volume of each product by firm
and year. If trade barriers change, for example with the entering into force of CAFTA-
3 See Wagner (2012) for an excellent overview of the empirical literature on firm performance and trade.
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DR, both extensive and intensive margin could change. For instance, fewer firms could
continue to export, i.e., the extensive margin would decrease, but quantities of goods
exported could increase, or vice versa.
In the following paragraphs, we first outline how we expect CAFTA-DR to affect
the number of firms and products as well as the volume of traded products. In a second
step, we introduce product differentiation to theoretically derive a different effect of
CAFTA-DR on the extensive vs. the intensive margin. And finally, we condition the
effect of CAFTA-DR on firm size to incorporate insights of new, new trade theory.
In general, based on the findings in Dutt et al. (2013) and Baier et al. (2014), one
could expect a positive effect of CAFTA-DR on the firm level extensive margin.
Following on our discussion in the section above, one could assume that for those
firms not exporting before CAFTA-DR was in force but which were efficient enough to
almost export, a lowering in trade barriers could tip the balance. Hence by lowering
trade barriers CAFTA-DR should allow some firms that were almost ready to export
before the agreement was in place, to start exporting once the agreement has entered
into force. Consequently, we should observe an increase in the extensive margin at the
firm level due to CAFTA-DR. One reason that might speak against this increase in the
extensive margin could be that gains at the intensive margin for firms already exporting
are large enough to crowd out any newcomers. In this case, gains at the intensive margin
of trade would dominate the extensive margin of trade as a result of trade liberalization.
This suggests that without further specifying the type of product under investigation,
which we will do further below, the theoretical expectations stay somewhat ambiguous.
At the product level extensive margin, one could also expect CAFTA-DR to have a
positive effect, i.e., allow firms that already export to expand their sets of products.
After all, a preferential trade agreement implies a reduction in trade barriers thus
lowering the costs of exporting. Furthermore, since these firms have already offset
the fix costs of starting to export a reduction in trade barriers should allow them to
expand the set of products.
On the intensive product level margin, one could also expect that CAFTA-DR might
allow those firms that already export to sell even more volume of these products, which
would imply an increase in the intensive margin of trade. Yet at the same time, and in
line with the results presented by Dutt et al. (2013) for the WTO, it might be that an
increase in the number of firms exporting increases competition and thus offsets any
gains on the intensive margin of trade. Hence whether CAFTA-DR should lead to an
increase in the intensive margin of trade is theoretically more ambiguous and again
calls for a differential treatment of the type of product under investigation.
Following Chaney (2008), we expect that the effect of a change in trade barriers
depends on the elasticity of substitution between varieties. This implies that an analysis
on the intensive and extensive margin should distinguish between homogenous prod-
ucts, i.e., products for which no or only little varieties exist (e.g., primary commodities
such as oil), and differentiated products, i.e., products for which a lot of varieties exist
(e.g., shoes, cloths, or furniture). In particular, Chaney (2008) shows that the intensive
margin reacts less pronounced to a change in trade barriers if the elasticity of substi-
tution is low (differentiated goods) than if products are easily substitutable (homoge-
nous goods). The reason is that in case of a low elasticity of substitution trade barriers
should have only little effect on the demand for each product since consumers are more
willing to pay higher prices for their preferred variety. Consequently, the intensive
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margin should react only little in case of highly differentiated goods whereas the
opposite pattern should occur in the case of homogenous goods, which should react
more strongly on the intensive margin to a change in trade barriers.
In contrast, the reaction at the extensive margin should be reversed: If products are
easily substitutable (homogenous goods) new firms can only capture a small share of the
export business. The reason follows from our discussion above: a change in trade
barriers implies that new firms can more easily enter the market, yet, since they have
not exported before they are typically less productive than those firms already exporting.
If goods are easily substitutable these new, less productive, firms can reap only a small
share of the market since they cannot easily compete with those more productive firms
that were already exporting. However, if elasticity of substitution is low (differentiated
goods) firms are better sheltered from competition and can reap a larger share of the
market. The reasoning is again that in case of a low elasticity of substitution the demand
for each variety should be less affected by trade barriers. Consequently, the extensive
margin should react little in case of homogenous goods but more strongly in case of
differentiated goods since new firms can enter more easily in the latter case.
Hence the two margins should react differently if differentiated versus homogenous
goods are concerned: while CAFTA-DR should have a strong effect on the extensive
margin for differentiated goods, its effect on the intensive margin, i.e., the volume of
trade, should only be marginal. For homogenous products, we would expect the
opposite pattern, i.e., a small effect on the extensive margin but a strong effect on the
intensive margin, i.e., a strong increase in the volume of trade. Table 1 summarizes
these theoretical expectations.
Finally, and further building on the insights of new, new trade theory, the effect of
CAFTA-DR should not materialize equally for all exporting firms. More precisely, we
expect the effect of CAFTA-DR to vary with the size of the firm. Following Melitz
(2003), firms that export differ from those that do not in that exporters tend to be more
productive and larger in size. The reason for this unequal effect of trade liberalization is
that only the most productive firms can offset the increased competition in their home
market by higher levels of exports. In the context of CAFTA-DR, this would imply that
the benefits of the agreement would go mainly to the most productive exporters in
Costa Rica, i.e., those firms that are larger in size. However, this conditional effect
should mainly happen on the intensive margin of trade. The reason is that those firms
that should profit most from a reduction in trade barriers should be the most profitable
firms. At the same time, the most profitable firms are most likely those that have
already exported prior to entering into force of a trade agreement. Hence CAFTA-DR
should increase exports more for those firms most profitable, i.e., the larger exporting
firms. The same logic should hold for the extensive margin at the product level. Also in
this case, the benefits of further trade liberalization in the form of an expansion of the
set of exported products should mainly go to those firms that are most profitable.
Table 1 Overview of theoretical
expectations with regard to prod-
uct differentiation
Homogenous
goods
Differentiated goods
Number of products by firm No increase Increase
Trade volume by firm Increase No increase
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3 Empirical analysis
Our empirical focus is on Costa Rica, an upper middle-income country, which is the
oldest democracy in Latin America, and after the debt-crisis of the 1980s has embarked
on an ambitious trade liberalization process. This is displayed in Table 2, which lists the
various PTAs Costa Rica belongs to. Our specific focus is on CAFTA-DR, which
liberalized trade between Central America, i.e., Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic on one side and the US on the
other. In 2007 Costa Rica held a nation-wide referendum on the ratification of CAFTA-
DR a first for a developing country. CAFTA-DR entered into force in 2009, thus
allowing for detailed assessment of its effects on firm and product level trade flows
given the time period covered in our export data.
Our selection of Costa Rica is motivated by several reasons. First and most
importantly, our data on product-firm-level yearly exports is unique in many ways. It
covers the universe of all exported products at the HS10 level for a substantial time
period (2000–2014). We obtained the data from Procomer (Promotora del Comercio
Exterior de Costa Rica), the Export Promotion Agency of Costa Rica, a public quasi-
independent agency founded in 1996, which is part of the Ministry of Trade. This data
allows us to test our theoretical expectations regarding the effect of CAFTA-DR on
firms’ intensive vs. extensive margin. The Procomer data lists for each exporting firm
and year the different products it exported, how much of each product and to which
country. The structure of the data is therefore unique in that it is suitable for analyzing
the intensive and the extensive margin, both at the firm and the product level.
Table 2 List of PTAs including Costa Rica
Year Name of agreement Countries
1967 FTA Central America El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
2002 FTA Canada-Costa Rica Canada
2002 FTA Chile-Central America Chile
2002 Dominican Republic-Central America Dominican Republic
2005 FTA CARICOM Trinidad and Tobago
2006 FTA CARICOM Barbados, Guyana
2011 FTA CARICOM Belize
2008 Panama-Central America Panama
2009 CAFTA-DR US
2011 China-Costa Rica China
2013 Mexico-Central America Mexico
2013 Costa Rica-Peru Peru
2013 Costa Rica-Singapore Singapore
2013 EU-Central America All EU countriesa
2014 EFTA-Central America Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland
a Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece;
Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania;
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom
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Furthermore, Lederman et al. (2011) can show that the aggregated Procomer data
closely corresponds to trade flow data by the World Bank underlying the validity of
the data. We will discuss the dataset in more detail in the following section.
Second, since Costa Rica is a rapidly growing, globalizing developing country it
provides a highly interesting case to examine the effects of a PTA. As Fig. 1 shows its
export volume has markedly increased for all different types of export markets over the
time span of our analysis. Most of the literature studying trade at the firm level focuses
on industrialized countries (Baccini et al. 2017; Eaton et al. 2004, 2011; Baggs and
Brander 2006). Hence we know very little about the effects of trade agreements in the
context of developing countries.
Third and finally, in order to allow for a meaningful analysis of the effect of trade
agreements on the intensive vs. extensive margin of trade enough variation should exist
concerning export markets, firms and products, which is a feature of the Costa Rican
export data. Without sufficient variation in the number of firms serving different
markets and different products being exported to these markets, it would be difficult
to estimate the distributional effects of CAFTA-DR on the extensive vs. the intensive
margin. Overall, Costa Rican firms serve a large number of export markets, ranging
from 123 in 2000 to 156 in 2014.4 Furthermore, over the entire timespan from 2000 to
2014, the Procomer dataset list 15,625 individual firms that exported at least one
specific product in at least one of the years under investigation. The number has
increased from 2416 in the year 2000 to more than 4000 firms in the year 2014.
Turning to the product level, we can observe that Costa Rica is not only very diversified
with regards to export markets but also exports a large number of different products.
While historically Costa Rica exported mainly agricultural commodities, this has
changed dramatically over the last decades. Products such as electrical machinery,
computers as well as some articles of apparel are among the products exported most.5
For the time period from 2000 to 2014, Costa Rican firms exported 9720 different
products at the HS10 level. Hence Costa Rican exports cover a wide range of industries
and firms allowing for a detailed assessment of CAFTA-DR for both the intensive and
the extensive margin of trade.
3.1 CAFTA-DR at a glance
The idea of negotiating a free trade agreement between Central America and the US
arose during a visit of US-President Bill Clinton for a Central American Presidential
Meeting in Costa Rica in 1997. Negotiations started in 2000 and the agreement was
signed on May 28, 2004 (Abrahamson 2007). However, the ratification processes was
met with strong opposition in all countries involved. Various Central American civil
society groups heavily criticized CAFTA-DR, most notably because of the perceived
low transparency of the negotiating process (Ribando 2005). These groups further
objected that CAFTA-DR would negatively affect the environment, working conditions
and the livelihood of poor and indigenous populations in Central America mainly
because of increased exposure to competition from the US and a strengthening of big
agricultural businesses (Ribando 2005).
4 Table 15 in the Appendix list for each year the top export markets.
5 Table 16 in the Appendix lists the top products in terms of export volume per year aggregated on the HS2 level.
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Also the ratification process of CAFTA-DR was far from smooth: For example, the
US House of Representatives only barely passed the BU.S.-Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act^ with a vote of 217 in
favor versus 215 against CAFTA-DR with two members abstaining. In Costa Rica, a
national referendum was held on CAFTA-DR, a first in the country’s history (Huhn and
Löding 2007). Despite the strong opposition CAFTA-DR faced in all countries, by
2009 all member countries had ratified the agreement and it entered into force.
In particular, member parties agreed to progressively phase out tariffs with each
country having negotiated a list of products for which elimination of duties could be
delayed. With tariffs on agricultural products being a contested area in the negotiation
phase, member countries were provided an additional time frame to phase out agricul-
tural duties. Yet by 2020, almost all duties on US agricultural products will be phased
out (export.gov 2016). Eventually, all agricultural products are supposed to become
duty-free. Exceptions are sugar imported by the US, onions and fresh potatoes imported
from Costa Rica, and white corn imported by the other Central American countries
(Hornbeck 2012). In addition to granting national treatment to all goods and eliminat-
ing most tariffs, CAFTA-DR includes regulation on intellectual property rights
(Chapter 15), investment and financial services (Chapters 10 and 12), telecommunica-
tions and electronic services (Chapters 13 and 14), environmental protection
(Chapter 17) as well as transparency (Chapter 18) and labor regulations (Chapter 16).
In 2011, the US was the first country to use CAFTA-DR’s dispute settlement mecha-
nism (Chapter 20) to address Guatemala’s failure to enforce its labor laws as agreed in
the agreement. Yet in June 2017, the arbitral panel ruled that the US was unable to
demonstrate that Guatemala’s failure to enforce its labor laws had affected trade
between the parties (ICTSD 2017).
3.2 Identification strategy
To be able to draw causal inference in a panel data set-up it is important to carefully
determine the correct control cases (Kosuke and Kim 2016). Our dataset includes data
on different types of export markets: a) it includes exports to countries with which
Fig. 1 Overall export volume per year
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Costa Rica has a PTA for the complete time span, e.g., El Salvador; b) it includes
exports for countries with which Costa Rica has no PTA for the period under investi-
gation, e.g., India; and c) countries for which Costa Rica enters into a PTA during the
period under investigation, e.g., the US or China. This implies that when evaluating the
effect of CAFTA-DR we need to thoroughly decide which exports to which markets to
compare with which control units. For example, simply comparing firms’ exports to
CAFTA-DR markets before and after the agreement entered into force with all other
markets would conflate for the control units both markets with and without Costa Rican
PTAs. Hence for all analyses below we carefully distinguish which exports we compare
to which control units.
Furthermore, as Table 2 above shows, Costa Rica has already had a PTA with all
other members of CAFTA-DR except the US. Hence trade was already liberalized
between Costa Rica and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Dominican
Republic. The major change that came along with CAFTA-DR was therefore the
preferential market access for the Central American countries with the US and vice
versa. However, this implies for our analysis that we need to focus our analysis of the
effect of CAFTA-DR on the US market only since there should not be any differences
for exporters to the other CAFTA-DR markets given their already existing trade
liberalization with Costa Rica.
Our empirical analysis is structured such that the first part of the analysis focuses
on the extensive margin and the second part on the intensive margin. The unit of
analysis for the first part of the analysis is a) the number of firms per export market
per year and the number of firms per industry and export market per year and b) the
number of products per firm, export market and year and the number of products
per industry, firm, export market and year. In our analysis of the intensive margin,
we choose a within firm design and evaluate for each firm already exporting to the
US before CAFTA-DR entered into force how its trade volume in general and
within different industries has changed over time with respect to other non-PTA
export markets. Since the unit of analysis as well as the control cases differ for each
of these analyses we define the respective dependent variable at the beginning of
each section below.
Since our dataset covers several years after CAFTA-DR entered into force we
analyze the effect of CAFTA-DR on all types of margins for all years possible. This
implies we compare the year before CAFTA-DR entered into force with 2009, 2010,
…, 2014 respectively. In addition, we evaluate how the averages of the respective
margins before and after CAFTA-DR entered into force thus taking into account all
years in our dataset (from 2000 to 2014).
Our main independent variables stay the same for all analyses below. In all
regressions we include two indicator variables: The first one indicates all exports
going to the US market and the second one indicates the time period after CAFTA-
DR is in force (2009 to 2014) as well as the interaction effect of the two. Using these
three indicator variables, we can estimate the difference in the extensive and intensive
margin before and after CAFTA-DR is in force for both markets that belong to
CAFTA-DR and markets that do not. In some analyses, we condition our regression
models on firm size measured as the number of employees. In particular, we separate
our analyses by small and big firms where big firms are defined as those firms with
more than 800 employees, which corresponds to the 90th percentile of the
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employment distribution.6 Finally, we include a measure of product differentiation in
some of the regression models. Following Osgood et al. (2016) we use a measure of
product differentiation based on the classification of goods in Rauch (1999). This
measure calculates the proportion of differentiated goods per HS2 category and ranges
from 0 (no differentiated goods in this HS2 category) to 1 (all goods in this HS2
category are differentiated goods). Table 3 lists all independent variables.
In addition, we employ a set of fixed-effects in each of the analysis below. In
particular, we use importer fixed effects, as is common in the literature. Since all
exports by definition come from the same country, i.e., Costa Rica, we cannot use
country-pair fixed effects, which is a common approach to deal with endogeneity
concerns in the literature (Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Matteo et al. 2017).7 This further
implies that by implication the importer fixed effects also control for other variables,
such as distance, that usual approaches following gravity model tend to incorporate
(Head and Mayer 2014; Limão 2016). Since our main approach is to compare two
points in time, we can also not use time fixed effects. Yet in the robustness section
below, we provide an analysis in which we rely on a panel set-up and which allows us
to incorporate also time fixed effects.
3.3 Analysis of firm level extensive margin
We start our analysis of the extensive margin with a focus on the number of firms. The
left panel of Fig. 2 therefore shows the overall number of firms that export per year
6 Procomer employment data does not cover all firms included in the dataset so the sample size is reduced for
those models including firm size. Furthermore for some firms employment data is not listed every year but
only once. In these cases, in order not to lose too many observations, we extrapolate the employment data per
firm for all years of our analysis to increase sample size.
Table 3 Independent variables
CAFTA-DR in
force
0 for the years 2000–2008
1 for the years 2009–2014
US market 0 for other markets
1 for US market
Interaction effect 1 for US market with CAFTA-DR DR in force
0 for all other observations
Firm size Big firm (more than 800 employees)
Small firm (less than 800 employees)
Product
differentiation
Proportion of products in HS2 category that are
differentiated according to Rauch (1999)
7 Clearly, an analysis of the effects of PTAs on trade flows raises issues of endogeneity. Furthermore, given the
specific set-up of our analysis, we cannot employ the standard approach using country-pair fixed effects to
deal with this issue. Yet in our particular setting, we argue that endogeneity should not significantly affect our
findings. The major part of our analysis relies on a within firm analysis that evaluates whether for firms already
in business before CAFTA-DR entered into force the extensive and the intensive margin of trade have
changed. Hence we carefully restrict most of our analysis to those firms serving both the US and other non-
PTA markets to evaluate keeping all firm-level aspects constant how their trading pattern has changed with
CAFTA-DR entering into force. Assuming reversed causality in this case would imply that the trading patterns
of these firms had any specific influence on the likelihood of CAFTA-DR being negotiated or implemented,
which we deem rather unlikely.
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while the right panel shows the number of new firms starting to export in a given year.
We can observe that both quantities noticeably increase after 2009. Figure 2 further
differentiates between the various types of markets and while there is an increase in the
number of firms for all markets, some seem to have profited more strongly than others
calling for a differentiated analysis.
Moreover, not all firms in our dataset continuously export. As Fig. 3 shows the
majority of the firms in our sample, about 55%, export for one year only. About 13% of
the firms export for two years and only about 3% of the firms in our sample, i.e., 481
firms in total, export over the whole time span of 15 years.8 At this descriptive stage of
the analysis, it is of course not possible to know whether the pattern displayed in Fig. 3
reflects a brief increase in the extensive margin as firms might have tried only once (and
thus rather unsuccessfully) to export to the US market. As we distinguish in our
analysis below between new export opportunities and the extension of already existing
export ties we will be able to better understand this pattern. Moreover, the results of our
firm level analysis at the industry level provides further indication of which industries
have seen an increase or a reduction in the number of firms.
Consequently, our analysis of the extensive margin at the firm level begins with an
evaluation of how the number of firms exporting to the US market has changed with
CAFTA-DR entering into force and whether new firms have become able to export to the
US.We rely on three types of dependent variables for this analysis: the overall number of
firms per export market and year, the number of new firms per export market and year
(defined by a firm that has not exported in the previous year), and the proportion of firms
exporting to the US. Furthermore, as discussed in detail above, we focus our comparison
on those markets that have not seen trade liberalization, i.e., markets without a PTA in
force, and the US market. In all of the below analyses, our unit of analysis is the country-
year. To control for potential confounders at the national level, such as geographic
distance, cultural proximity etc., we employ country-level fixed effects in all regressions.
Since CAFTA-DR entered into force in 2009 we compare the year 2008 with all
years following CAFTA-DR, i.e., 2009 (Model 1) to 2014 (Model 6). Finally, Model
(7) evaluates the average effects in that it compares the average number of firms per
export markets from 2000 to 2008 with the average number between 2009 and 2014.
Due to our dependent variable being a count variable we use Poisson regression models.
Fig. 2 Number of overall and new firms serving the different types of markets
8 To obtain this figure we have aggregated the data on the firm level such that each firm exporting any type of
product to any kind of market in a specific year forms the unit of analysis.
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The results displayed in Table 4 show that for most years the results correspond to
our theoretical expectations: While the US market in general attracts more firms than
other non-PTA markets there is a significant increase in the number of firms associated
with the entering into force of the agreement for the years 2010 to 2014. This suggests
that with CAFTA-DR new firms were able to reap the benefits of exporting to the US
market. Only if we consider the year directly after CAFTA-DR entered into force, 2009,
and the model using average numbers do we obtain diverging results.
If we look at the number of new firms entering the US market after CAFTA-DR
came into force, as displayed in Table 5, we again find support for our theoretical
expectations. While the year directly following CAFTA-DR, 2009, again saw a
Fig. 3 Number of years that each firm in the dataset exports between 2000 and 2014 to any kind of export market
Table 4 Extensive margin: overall number of firms (Poisson regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 6.72*** 6.64*** 7.35*** 7.37*** 6.84*** 7.35*** 7.48***
(0.230) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.150) (0.025) (0.023)
CAFTA year 0.02 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.38***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
US*CAFTA −0.04** 0.05** 0.06** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.10*** −0.11***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
Constant 0.40* 0.48*** −0.23*** −0.25*** 0.28* −0.22*** −0.38***
(0.230) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.150) (0.025) (0.023)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 250 270 269 271 276 280 280
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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reduction in the number of new firms, all following years are characterized by a
significant increase. This is also true for Model (7) using the average numbers of
new firms. Hence CAFTA-DR seems to have had a positive effect on the firm-level
extensive margin as both the overall number of firms as well as the number of new
firms has increased. Thus CAFTA-DR seems to provide export opportunities for
additional firms not previously exporting to the US market.
However, if we look at the proportion of all Costa Rican firms exporting to the US
(i.e., the number of firms exporting to the US divided by the total number of firms
exporting), see Table 6, the picture changes completely: While overall the US market
attracted a larger share of Costa Rican exporters, this share has significantly decreased
over the entire time span since CAFTA-DR has entered into force. This suggests that
although new firms were able to access the US market, other markets were even more
attractive for Costa Rican exporters resulting in a decreasing share of Costa Rican firms
exporting to the US.
Turning from these aggregated effects to a more disaggregate analysis, Fig. 4 shows
how the number of firms has changed for the US market with CAFTA-DR in force at
the industry level. Each panel of Fig. 4 displays for each HS1 level the coefficient of the
interaction effect between the US market and the corresponding year after CAFTA-DR
entered into force as well as the 95% confidence interval.9 The results in Fig. 4 show
that at least from 2010 onwards several industries have gained with CAFTA-DR
entering into force. The mineral products, headgear/footwear, stone/glass and metals
industries all saw an increase in the overall number of firms. With respect to the number
of new firms entering the US market the picture is even more positive as almost all
industries have gained and especially so for the animal and animal products industry
(HS codes 1–5). The corresponding Fig. 7 is provided in the Appendix.
Figure shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the interaction effect
between US market and CAFTA-DR dummies based on HS1 level regressions. The
Table 5 Extensive margin: number of new firms (Poisson Regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 5.55*** 31.40*** 32.10*** 33.34*** 36.29*** 35.31*** 6.20***
(0.042) (2.003) (1.003) (1.003) (1.005) (1.003) (0.034)
CAFTA year 0.14*** 0.47*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.042) (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049) (0.034)
US*CAFTA −0.19*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.66*** 0.81*** 0.77*** 0.12***
(0.042) (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049) (0.034)
Constant −0.14*** −25.99*** −26.70*** −27.93*** −30.88*** −29.91*** −1.88***
(0.042) (2.003) (1.003) (1.003) (1.005) (1.003) (0.034)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 224 246 241 242 245 250 278
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
9 The regression tables can be found in Table 17 in the Appendix.
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coefficients are based on 15 different regression models each representing one industry
as defined by HS1. The figure lists the HS codes for the industries: 1–5 BAnimal &
Animal Products^, 6–15 BVegetable Products^, 16–24 BFoodstuffs^, 25–27 BMineral
Products^ 28–38 BChemicals^, 39–40 BPlastics / Rubbers^, 41–43 BRaw Hides, Skins,
Leather & Furs^, 44–49 BWood & Wood Products^, 50–63 BTextiles^, 64–67
BFootwear / Headgear^, 68–71 BStone / Glass^, 72–83 BMetals^, 84–85 BMachinery
/ Electrical^, 86–89 BTransportation^, 90–97 BMiscellaneous^.
Table 6 Extensive margin: proportion of firms (OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.44***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.00 −0.00* −0.00* −0.00** −0.00* −0.00* 0.00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
US*CAFTA −0.00*** −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.03***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** −0.00***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 250 270 269 271 276 280 280
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Fig. 4 Effect of CAFTA-DR on US market by industry (HS1 level)
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3.4 Within firm analysis extensive margin: Number of products
In this part of the analysis, we still evaluate the effect of CAFTA-DR on the
extensive margin, yet, we further disaggregate as now the focus is on the number
of products. In all of our analyses below, we opt for a within firm design using
firm level fixed effect regression models. This implies that for each firm
exporting to the US before CAFTA-DR entered into force we assess how many
different products, measured at the HS10 level, it exports to the US market
compared to other non-liberalized markets. To allow for a meaningful compari-
son, we further impose the following restrictions. We exclude those firms that
export only to the US market since for these firms we cannot compare how their
export portfolio has changed with CAFTA-DR entering into force since our
analysis relies on within firm variation. Furthermore, we exclude those firms
that stopped exporting before 2008 since their exit from business should be
unrelated to CAFTA-DR. We also provide identical analyses using the number
of new products per firm (defined as a product that this firm has not exported to
this market in the previous year). Due to space constraints the corresponding
regression tables using the number of new products as dependent variable are
displayed in the Appendix.
The results in Table 7 provide clear support for our theoretical expectations.
Both the overall number of products as well as the number of new products
(which is displayed in Table 18 in the Appendix) significantly increases with
CAFTA-DR entering into force. Hence firms exporting to the US already in
2008 could increase their set of products in all years following the trade
agreement.
However, the results in Table 7 hide some important industry level variation as not
all industries saw an increase in the extensive margin, as displayed in Fig. 5, which is
Table 7 Extensive margin within firm number of products (Fixed effects linear regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 0.37*** 6.10*** 4.98*** 1.24*** 2.94** 3.28*** 0.32***
(0.024) (1.618) (0.208) (0.415) (1.331) (0.840) (0.027)
CAFTA year −0.19*** −0.27*** −0.38*** −0.39*** −0.46*** −0.46*** −0.34***
(0.046) (0.066) (0.079) (0.068) (0.072) (0.081) (0.050)
CAFTA*US 0.26*** 0.49*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.21** 0.14 0.35***
(0.049) (0.076) (0.081) (0.083) (0.085) (0.093) (0.054)
Constant 6.04*** 0.25 1.47*** 5.23*** 3.48** 3.09*** 6.15***
(0.163) (1.448) (0.104) (0.224) (1.439) (0.845) (0.173)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 21,232 22,224 23,025 23,783 24,443 25,041 21,232
R2 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.32
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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constructed identically to Fig. 4 above.10 The results show that several industries even
saw a decrease in the extensive margin at the product level, such as animal and animal
products, vegetable products, foodstuffs and for some years the chemicals and textiles
industries. On the other hand, industries that were able to gain at the extensive margin
were the mineral products, plastics and rubbers, metals, machinery/electrical, transpor-
tation as well as the miscellaneous category industries. Given these heterogeneous
effects at the industry level the question arises whether the winning respectively losing
industries at the extensive margin have in common that their products are mostly
differentiated or rather homogenous. Hence we condition our analysis in the next step
on our measure on product differentiation.
Figure shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the interaction effect
between US market and CAFTA-DR dummies based on HS1 level regressions. The
coefficients are based on 15 different regression models each representing one industry
as defined by HS1. The figure lists the HS codes for the industries: 1–5 BAnimal &
Animal Products^, 6–15 BVegetable Products^, 16–24 BFoodstuffs^, 25–27 BMineral
Products^ 28–38 BChemicals^, 39–40 BPlastics / Rubbers^, 41–43 BRaw Hides, Skins,
Leather & Furs^, 44–49 BWood & Wood Products^, 50–63 BTextiles^, 64–67
BFootwear / Headgear^, 68–71 BStone / Glass^, 72–83 BMetals^, 84–85 BMachinery
/ Electrical^, 86–89 BTransportation^, 90–97 BMiscellaneous^.
To take into account that the extensive margin should react differently if a product is
differentiated or not, Table 8 includes our measure on product differentiation at the HS2
level based on Rauch (1999). In particular, we count the number of products by firm at the
10 The individual regressions underlying Fig. 5 can be found in the Appendix in Table 19.
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HS2 level to be able to interact this with the measure on product differentiation. Our main
quantity of interest in Table 8 is therefore the interaction effect for the US market after
CAFTA-DR entered into force for differentiated products, which corresponds to the last
line in the regression table. We further include all lower types of interaction effects.
The results in Table 8 clearly support our theoretical expectations as the positive
effect on the extensive margin at the product level only materializes for firms producing
differentiated products (indicated by the positive and statistically significant interaction
effect).11 Hence with CAFTA-DR entering into force firms producing differentiated
products seem to gain by exporting more varieties while firms producing homogenous
products seem to lose at the extensive margin (as displayed by the negative coefficient
on CAFTA-DR*US interaction effect).
In a final step, we differentiate in our analysis on the extensive margin whether firms
are of large (more than 800 employees) or of small size. The results for small (Table 9)
versus big firms (Table 10) provide for some unexpected findings. While we theoret-
ically expected big firms to be able to better reap the gains from CAFTA-DR, it is the
small firms that seem to benefit at the extensive margin instead. The positive effect for
the interaction effect in Table 9 indicates that with CAFTA-DR entering into force
Table 8 Extensive margin within firm number of products (fixed effects linear regression) including product
differentiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 0.43*** −0.32*** −0.46 0.34*** 1.05*** −0.32*** 0.56***
(0.010) (0.100) (0.292) (0.034) (0.054) (0.035) (0.013)
CAFTA year −0.22*** −0.28*** −0.35*** −0.31*** −0.36*** −0.37*** −0.28***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031)
CAFTA*US 0.02 −0.16*** −0.11*** −0.03 −0.22*** −0.27*** −0.16***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034)
CAFTA*dif prod 0.07* 0.08* 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 −0.05
(0.041) (0.047) (0.053) (0.055) (0.056) (0.062) (0.047)
US*dif prod 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.09*** −0.05***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.026) (0.015)
CAFTA*dif prod*US 0.04 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.11** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.26***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.048) (0.054) (0.055) (0.061) (0.046)
Constant 1.81*** 2.58*** 2.76*** 1.92*** 1.25*** 2.65*** 1.89***
(0.084) (0.094) (0.276) (0.077) (0.042) (0.052) (0.071)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 42,215 45,502 48,091 50,343 52,285 54,099 42,215
R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.48
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
11 Again the results are almost identical if we use the number of new products by firm instead of the overall
number of products, see Table 22 in the Appendix.
Trade at the margin: Estimating the economic implications of...
smaller firms were able to export more products to the US. In contrast, the results in
Table 10 show that larger firms, in contrast, even display a decrease in the number of
products for most years though not on average as Model (7) shows.12
3.5 Analysis of firm level intensive margin
An analysis of the intensive margin at the firm level implies an evaluation of CAFTA-
DR for those firms that have been in business before the agreement entered into force in
2009. Again, we rely on a within-firm design and evaluate for each firm serving the US
market in the year 2008 how much its export volume to the US changed with CAFTA-
DR in force compared to the same firms’ export volume to non-PTA countries. Hence
the unit of analysis is again the firm exporting to a specific market in year t. Our
quantity of interest is thus ln Vf,m,t, i.e., the logged volume of exports V for firm f to
market m in year t. We again exclude exports to other PTA countries.
A further complication arises for those firms exporting in 2008 but not exporting in any
of the following years. Since in this year their export volume is zero the question arises
how to treat these zero observations because of the log-scale of the dependent variable.
We follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and use a Poisson pseudo-maximum-
likelihood method.13 Using a Poisson model has two advantages over other approaches
as it corrects for both the heteroscedasticity of the error term in regressions on trade flows
and for the large amount of zero observations. To further limit the potential zeros in our
dataset, we add in Model (8) a comparison of the averages before and after CAFTA-DR
entered into force but excluding those firms exporting less than USD 5000 on average.
12 Again the results are almost identical if we use the number of new products by firm instead of the overall
number of products, see Tables 20 and 21 in the Appendix.
Table 9 Extensive margin within firm number of products (fixed effects linear regression) for small firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 1.00*** 7.56*** 1.50*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 5.92*** 1.00***
(0.000) (2.745) (0.198) (0.000) (0.000) (0.664) (0.000)
CAFTA year −0.12 −0.30 −0.37* −0.13 −0.12 −0.27 −0.96***
(0.108) (0.301) (0.197) (0.160) (0.199) (0.323) (0.132)
CAFTA*US 0.34*** 1.52*** 1.05*** 1.43*** 1.14*** 1.45*** 0.63***
(0.097) (0.191) (0.128) (0.170) (0.193) (0.239) (0.112)
Constant 5.82*** 7.56** 21.95*** 4.85*** 8.17*** 2.24 5.08***
(1.221) (3.337) (5.943) (1.160) (1.523) (1.463) (1.143)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7620 7870 7631 7531 7406 7197 7620
R2 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.58
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
13 Although trade data are no count data, using a Poisson model is appropriate since theoretically deriving the
gravity equation leads to a form corresponding to the Poisson model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006).
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Table 11 displays the results using this specific approach. In all regressions, inde-
pendent of their specification, the US market in general attracts more exports than other
markets, yet, the interaction effect indicating the effect of CAFTA-DR on the US
market is insignificant in all models. Hence so far we do not observe a significant
effect of CAFTA-DR on the intensive margin of trade.
In line with our analyses on the extensive margin above, our next step is to
differentiate by industries. The results are displayed in Fig. 6, which again corresponds
in its set-up to Figs. 4 and 5 above.14 In contrast to the results on the extensive margin,
only few industries clearly gain or lose at the intensive margin. The industries that gain
on the intensive margin at least for certain years are footwear and headgear, transpor-
tation and chemicals. Even fewer industries seem to lose on the intensive margin of
trade, such as raw hides, skins, leather and furs or mineral products for some years.
However, the majority of industries do not see any significant movement after
CAFTA-DR entered into force. One reason for why we might see so few significant
results at the intensive margin is that some industries might conflate rather homoge-
nous and differentiated goods. Hence as a next step and in line with our theoretical
expectations on the varying effects of trade agreements at the extensive and intensive
margin for differentiated vs. homogenous goods we need to evaluate these two aspects
separately.
Figure shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the interaction effect
between US market and CAFTA-DR dummies based on HS1 level regressions. The
coefficients are based on 15 different regression models each representing one industry
as defined by HS1. The figure lists the HS codes for the industries: 1–5 BAnimal &
Animal Products^, 6–15 BVegetable Products^, 16–24 BFoodstuffs^, 25–27 BMineral
Products^ 28–38 BChemicals^, 39–40 BPlastics / Rubbers^, 41–43 BRaw Hides, Skins,
14 The individual regressions underlying Fig. 6 can be found in the Appendix in Table 23.
Table 10 Extensive margin within firm number of products (fixed effects linear regression) for big firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 0.01 0.35*** 2.46*** 1.11** 0.43*** 0.39*** −0.39***
(0.039) (0.021) (0.555) (0.427) (0.025) (0.031) (0.043)
CAFTA year −0.17*** −0.23*** −0.23*** −0.22*** −0.23*** −0.18*** −0.08**
(0.040) (0.034) (0.038) (0.029) (0.032) (0.051) (0.034)
CAFTA*US 0.08 −0.23*** −0.37*** −0.12*** −0.31*** −0.30*** 0.43***
(0.053) (0.037) (0.041) (0.032) (0.037) (0.054) (0.054)
Constant 5.79*** 5.41*** 3.24*** 4.61*** 5.25*** 5.30*** 6.14***
(0.293) (0.289) (0.342) (0.587) (0.213) (0.194) (0.280)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 13,612 14,354 15,394 16,252 17,037 17,844 13,612
R2 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.19
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Leather & Furs^, 44–49 BWood & Wood Products^, 50–63 BTextiles^, 64–67
BFootwear / Headgear^, 68–71 BStone / Glass^, 72–83 BMetals^, 84–85 BMachinery
/ Electrical^, 86–89 BTransportation^, 90–97 BMiscellaneous^.
Table 11 Intensive margin within firm trade volume (Poisson regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages Averages
Big
US 13.23*** 11.31*** 10.13*** 10.98*** 10.72*** 9.99*** 3.97*** 2.94***
(1.079) (1.120) (1.045) (1.049) (1.118) (1.121) (0.804) (0.211)
CAFTA year −0.18 −0.27 −0.31 −0.25 −0.24 −0.35* 0.06 −0.10
(0.184) (0.186) (0.197) (0.193) (0.197) (0.190) (0.163) (0.278)
CAFTA*US −0.03 0.18 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.34
(0.243) (0.241) (0.244) (0.248) (0.255) (0.252) (0.223) (0.312)
Constant −9.72*** −9.22*** −6.28*** −8.58*** −7.79*** −9.48*** 3.69*** 11.05***
(1.470) (1.501) (1.445) (1.442) (1.492) (1.521) (0.921) (0.499)
Country fixed
effects
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed
effects
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 18,720 19,321 19,906 20,423 20,880 20,880 20,880 20,797
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Fig. 6 Within firm trade volume by industry
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Table 12 thus shows the results conditioning on the degree of product differentiation.
The coefficients on the final interaction term are, with the exception ofModel 1 evaluating
the year 2009, not statistically significant. Hence the results are in line with the theoretical
underpinning that the intensive margin should react little or not at all to trade liberalization
in case of differentiated goods. In contrast, the interaction effect between CAFTA*US is
positive and statistically significant for most years. Hence for homogenous products
exported to the US market after CAFTA-DR entered into force (which precisely corre-
sponds to this interaction effect) we observe an increase at the intensive margin. This
implies that while firms exporting differentiated products saw no effect or even a decline in
their export volume to the US, firms exporting homogenous goods were able to increase
their exports.
However, interpreting solely the coefficient of the interaction term between
CAFTA*US does not tell us whether this effect pertains to trade creation or trade
diversion. Hence it might be that the increase in volume, which we observe for the US
for homogenous products implies that this comes at the price of other countries
receiving less of these products. If we consider the coefficient on CAFTA year in
Table 12, which measures the change in the volume of homogenous goods to other
PTAs, we observe a negative sign. This suggests that the increase at the intensive
margin for homogenous goods to the US market do indeed come at the cost of diverting
trade in these goods away from other non-PTA members.
In a final step, we condition our analysis of the intensive margin on employment, as
displayed in Tables 13 and 14. This time we observe almost the opposite picture as for
the extensive margin above. While the interaction effects are mostly insignificant for
Table 12 Intensive margin within firm trade volume (Poisson regression) including product differentiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages Big
Averages
US 8.07*** 7.75*** 8.01*** 8.78*** 8.78*** 8.63*** 4.34*** 2.53***
(1.092) (1.105) (1.104) (1.115) (1.107) (1.108) (0.420) (0.576)
CAFTA year −1.16*** −1.06*** −0.97*** −1.20*** −1.24*** −1.23*** −0.37*** −0.37***
(0.308) (0.261) (0.286) (0.292) (0.295) (0.267) (0.069) (0.069)
CAFTA*US 0.99** 0.91* 0.88* 1.06** 1.05* 1.14** 0.07 0.07
(0.499) (0.482) (0.513) (0.537) (0.552) (0.535) (0.099) (0.099)
CAFTA*dif prod 1.35** 0.99** 0.80 1.09* 1.11* 0.82 −0.22*** −0.22***
(0.580) (0.422) (0.569) (0.572) (0.594) (0.520) (0.086) (0.086)
US*dif prod 0.71* 0.71* 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.67 −0.09 −0.09
(0.421) (0.420) (0.422) (0.422) (0.421) (0.420) (0.069) (0.069)
CAFTA*dif prod *US −1.50* −1.12 −0.93 −1.09 −1.17 −1.17 0.17 0.17
(0.887) (0.775) (0.912) (0.933) (0.960) (0.869) (0.124) (0.124)
Constant −5.96*** −7.56*** −7.72*** −8.02*** −7.45*** −8.06*** 2.34*** 10.48***
(1.308) (1.463) (1.466) (1.319) (1.341) (1.473) (0.451) (0.599)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 35,863 38,513 40,544 42,329 43,858 45,319 45,319 45,187
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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both small and big firms, the sign has flipped: it is the small firms that seem to lose on
the intensive margin whereas the big firms tend to gain (though not statistically so).
Hence while small firms are able to export more varieties following CAFTA-DR this
seems to come at the price of a reduction in the volume of existing varieties. In contrast,
big firms tend not to export more types of products but slightly more volume in their
existing product categories.
3.6 Robustness checks
To provide some confidence in the robustness of our results, we provide two different
sorts of robustness checks. First, we estimate our main models on the product-level
extensive and intensive margin including product specifications for all years for which
we have data, i.e., from 2000 to 2014 (see Appendix Tables 24 and 26). In particular,
these models follow the same set-up as in Tables 8 and 12 above in that they include
all interaction effects accounting for product differentiation. Furthermore, these
models not only include country and firm level fixed effects but also year fixed
effects. The results as displayed in Tables 24 and 26 are identical to our findings
obtained by comparing all years separately as displayed in Tables 8 and 12. Hence by
including this longer time horizon the models provide confidence that our results are
not sensitive to our selected baseline year and therefore not driven by anticipation
effects of CAFTA-DR.
Second, we include tariff data in our main specification as presented in Tables 8 and
12 above to control for the specific content of CAFTA-DR (see Appendix Tables 25
and 27). Since we compare in our analyses the US with other non-PTA markets we
created a variable that contains the MFN tariff for all non-PTA countries for all years.
For the US this variable also contains MFN tariffs before CAFTA-DR entered into
Table 13 Intensive margin within firm trade volume (Poisson regression) for small firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages Averages
Big
US −3.92*** −1.42*** 0.86** 1.76** 1.26 1.47*** 1.80*** 1.80***
(0.269) (0.239) (0.351) (0.826) (1.070) (0.497) (0.133) (0.133)
CAFTA year 0.06 0.15 0.27** 0.23* 0.23* 0.32** 0.52*** 0.52***
(0.110) (0.112) (0.116) (0.119) (0.126) (0.128) (0.106) (0.106)
CAFTA*US −0.34** −0.24 −0.24 −0.17 −0.20 −0.28* −0.14 −0.14
(0.145) (0.150) (0.153) (0.155) (0.165) (0.171) (0.127) (0.127)
Constant 18.15*** 17.01*** 10.52*** 14.06*** 9.83*** 9.59*** 8.59*** 14.92***
(0.437) (0.328) (0.621) (1.173) (1.121) (0.602) (0.168) (0.168)
Country fixed
effects
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6495 6706 6484 6415 6317 6135 6135 6135
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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force and it contains the specific tariff lines as agreed in CAFTA-DR for all following
years.15 Given that our product-level data is more disaggregated than the tariff data the
number of observations in Tables 25 and 27 is less than the number of observations in
our original models. This is also the main reason why we refrain from including tariff
data in all our specification. The results in Tables 25 and 27 support our main findings.
The results for the extensive margin show that for most years under analysis it is mainly
the exporters of differentiated goods that can increase their product portfolio. This
becomes mostly apparent in the model specification using averages. The results on the
intensive margin are completely identical to the results discussed above and therefore
provide strong support that it is mainly the exporters of homogenous products that are
able to reap the benefits of trade liberalization at the intensive margin.
4 Discussion and conclusion
What are the distributional consequences of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)?
According to models of new, new trade theory (Melitz 2003) trade liberalization benefits
not all firms within industries equally but more productive and thus mostly large firms
have clear advantages when competing in foreign markets and thus reaping the benefits
attached to trade liberalization. In addition to the question which firms gain most from
trade liberalization, a hitherto unanswered question in the context of preferential trade
liberalization is whether trade agreements mainly benefit those firms that were already
able to serve foreign markets by expanding the volume of existing trade, thus increasing
the intensive margin of trade, or whether trade agreements also expand the set of
exporting firms and products, thus increasing the extensive margin of trade?
The results of our study suggest that the economic effects of one such trade
agreement, the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), are rather heterogeneous depending on both the margin of
trade as well as the type of the firm and especially the product under analysis. In
particular, our findings suggest that although CAFTA-DR allowed new firms to enter
the US market and the overall number of firms exporting to the US market increased
with CAFTA-DR entering into force, the proportion of firms exporting to the US
relative to other markets has declined. Hence while the absolute attractiveness of the
US market for Costa Rican firms seems to have increased with more firms using the
opportunities that came with CAFTA-DR to export to the US market, the relative
importance of the US market vis-à-vis other non-PTA markets, which for example in
the case of our analysis includes China, seems to have decreased.
Turning to the product level, our within firm analysis shows while CAFTA-DR had
no significant unconditional effect at the intensive margin of trade the agreement had a
positive effect on the extensive margin for all firms. Hence CAFTA-DR allowed firms
to increase the varieties of products that they export to the US market. Yet, while on
average all firms were able to export more products to the US market after 2009, there
are underlying distributional effects. First and in contrast to the findings of other studies
(e.g., Baccini et al. 2017), it is mainly small firms that were able to profit from this
15 The MFN tariff data is from http://wits.worldbank.org/ and the CAFTA-DR schedule for the US is from
http://tariffdata.wto.org/default.aspx complemented by data from the UNCTAD TRAINS data bank.
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expansion on the extensive margin. Second, and clearly supporting our theoretical
arguments on product differentiation, the effect of CAFTA-DR depends on the type of
product: Firms producing differentiated products tend to gain by exporting more
varieties while firms producing homogenous products do not. This pattern is complete-
ly reversed if we evaluate the intensive margin of trade. While overall we do not
observe any significant effect on the intensive margin, firms exporting homogenous
goods were able to increase their exports while firms exporting differentiated products
saw no effect or even a decline in their export volume to the US. Hence firms producing
homogenous goods seem to clearly profit from CAFTA-DR in that they can export
even more of the same products they have already exported. Following Chaney (2008)
the reasoning for this finding is that the demand of homogenous goods is very sensitive
to trade barriers. In contrast, the demand for differentiated goods is less sensitive to
trade barriers implying that for these types of products we should see little reaction at
the intensive margin, exactly as our findings suggest. However, the very same logic
suggests that new firms can enter more easily in the case of differentiated goods and we
therefore see an increase in the extensive margin.
While it was long clear that the distributional consequences of trade liberalization
are heterogeneous, the literature on the effects of PTAs has only recently started to
analyze such effects not only between but also within industries (e.g., Baccini et al.
2017). Our study adds to this nascent literature, as our disaggregated firm-product level
data enables us to study the effects of CAFTA-DR on the extensive and the intensive
margin both at the firm and at the product level. Yet our findings have further
implications than simply providing new empirical evidence on the distributional
consequences of preferential trade liberalization. Our findings suggest that depending
on the type of product (homogenous vs. differentiated) the benefits from trade liberal-
ization materialize differently and this should have implications for the coalitions of
trade supporters. For those firms producing homogenous goods, such as primary
commodities, the benefits seem to be concentrated on those firms already exporting
before trade has been liberalized as these firms mainly see an increase in the intensive
margin of trade. Hence these firms probably know well in advance of the benefits
coming along with trade liberalization and might lobby accordingly. As these firms
should also be larger in size their voice in the trade liberalization process might well
sound loud (see also Osgood et al. 2017 on this point). In contrast, the benefits of trade
liberalization for differentiated products seem more diffuse. As producers of differen-
tiated products do not seem to gain at the intensive margin, i.e., they do not see an
increase in their existing volume of trade, but mainly at the extensive margin, i.e., new
types of products and new firms enter the market, coordinated action for producers of
differentiated goods might be a more difficult enterprise.
In addition to a better understanding the distributional effects of trade liberalization
between firms, this paper fills another gap in the literature, which so far mainly deals
with the economic effects of PTAs for industrialized countries. Yet over the last decades
more and more developing and emerging market economies have started to negotiate
PTAs rendering it important to better understand the impact of PTAs on such econo-
mies. The example of Costa Rica shows that the effects of trade agreements on the
extensive and the intensive margin of trade seem to closely correspond to the patterns
as expected by theoretical models on this topic (Chaney 2008) in that the extensive
margin reacts more strongly for differentiated products and the intensive margin for
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homogenous products. Whether these findings also hold for other emerging economies
could be an avenue for future research. Overall our findings for Costa Rica seem to
suggest a trade-off: while firms, especially those exporting differentiated products, can
profit from trade agreements by enlarging their portfolio of products, this implies at the
same time an increased competition for all other exporters. As a consequence, the
intensive margin, i.e., the volume of trade, tends to decrease. And the exact opposite
tends to happen for more homogenous goods implying that agreements cannot deliver
both increased volume and more products for all types of goods.
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Appendix
Table 15 lists the top export markets for Costa Rican products. With the exception of the
various EU markets, the most important trading partners can be found in close vicinity of
Costa Rica. Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, Honduras,Mexico as well as the
Dominican Republic are among the most important trading partners. Over the entire time
period, the top one export market in terms of export volume stayed the same, namely the
United States. Interestingly, from 2005 onwards and thus clearly preceding the China-
Costa Rica PTA entering into force in 2011, one can observe the rise of Hong Kong and
China as important export markets for the Costa Rican economy. Already in 2005, Hong
Kong has become the second biggest export market in terms of export volume.
Table 15 Top 8 markets per year (value of exports)
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
2000 US Netherlands UK Guatemala Nicaragua Germany El Salvador Panama
2001 US Netherlands Guatemala Nicaragua Malaysia El Salvador Panama UK
2002 US Netherlands Guatemala Nicaragua Honduras Panama Germany El Salvador
2003 US Netherlands Guatemala Malaysia Nicaragua Germany El Salvador Panama
2004 US Netherlands Guatemala Germany Nicaragua El Salvador Honduras Panama
2005 US Hong Kong Netherlands Guatemala Nicaragua China Honduras Panama
2006 US China Hong Kong Netherlands Guatemala Nicaragua Honduras Panama
2007 US China Hong Kong Netherlands Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Honduras
2008 US China Netherlands Hong Kong Panama Nicaragua Guatemala Honduras
2009 US China Netherlands Panama Hong Kong Nicaragua Guatemala Belgium
2010 US Netherlands Hong Kong Panama Nicaragua Guatemala Belgium Honduras
2011 US Netherlands Panama Hong Kong Nicaragua Guatemala Honduras Mexico
2012 US Netherlands Panama Hong Kong Nicaragua Guatemala Honduras China
2013 US Netherlands Hong Kong Panama Nicaragua Guatemala China Honduras
2014 US Netherlands Panama Nicaragua Guatemala Hong Kong Malaysia Belgium
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Table 16 List of products that belong to the top five products in one of the years under study according to
their export volume
HS 2 code Name
HS 08 Edible Fruits & Nuts, Peel of Citrus/Melons
HS 09 Coffee, Tea, Mate & Spices
HS 20 Preparations of Vegetables, Fruits, Nuts, etc.
HS 21 Miscellaneous Edible Preparations
HS 30 Pharmaceutical Products
HS 61 Articles of Apparel & Clothing Accessories-Knitted or Crocheted
HS 62 Articles of Apparel & Clothing Accessories-Not Knitted or Crocheted
HS 80 Tin & Articles Thereof
HS 84 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery, Mechanical Appliances, Computers
HS 85 Electrical Machinery & Equip. & Parts, Telecommunications Equip., Sound Recorders,
Television Recorders
HS 90 Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, Precision Medical Or Surgical
Instruments & Accessories
Table 17 Poisson regression models: number of firms per industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
HS 1–5 BAnimal & Animal Products^
US 3.58*** 3.58*** 3.58*** 3.58*** 3.58*** 3.58*** 3.90***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year −0.17** 0.26*** 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.02
(0.076) (0.075) (0.115) (0.103) (0.086) (0.112) (0.073)
CAFTA*US 0.22*** 0.17** 0.06 0.76*** 1.52*** 1.11*** 0.56***
(0.076) (0.075) (0.115) (0.103) (0.086) (0.112) (0.073)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 69 72 73 73 74 73 72
HS 6–15 BVegetable Products^
US 6.30*** 6.30*** 6.30*** 6.30*** 6.30*** 6.30*** 6.26***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year −0.01 0.04 0.08** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.27***
(0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.048) (0.053) (0.035)
CAFTA*US −0.04 −0.08** −0.11*** −0.22*** −0.23*** −0.21*** −0.28***
(0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.048) (0.053) (0.035)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 189 193 192 194 198 202 193
HS 16–24 BFoodstuffs^
US 4.73*** 4.73*** 4.73*** 4.73*** 4.73*** 4.73*** 4.64***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year −0.03 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.37***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) (0.053) (0.039)
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Table 17 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
CAFTA*US 0.01 −0.19*** −0.15*** −0.19*** −0.16*** −0.19*** −0.25***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) (0.053) (0.039)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 148 163 153 165 165 165 163
HS: 25–27 BMineral Products^
US 2.08*** 2.08*** 2.08*** 2.08*** 2.08*** 2.08*** 2.48***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year −0.11 −0.04 −0.30* −0.25** −0.15 −0.14 −0.11**
(0.090) (0.088) (0.153) (0.100) (0.121) (0.105) (0.050)
CAFTA*US 0.60*** 0.73*** 1.11*** 1.06*** 0.96*** 1.01*** 0.47***
(0.090) (0.088) (0.153) (0.100) (0.121) (0.105) (0.050)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 49 48 56 49 51 50 48
HS 28–38 BChemicals^
US 4.32*** 4.32*** 4.32*** 4.32*** 4.32*** 4.32*** 4.40***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.05 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.27***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.051) (0.043) (0.046) (0.041) (0.036)
CAFTA*US 0.08* 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.00
(0.042) (0.044) (0.051) (0.043) (0.046) (0.041) (0.036)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 135 143 143 138 142 142 143
HS 39–40 BPlastics / Rubbers^
US 5.02*** 5.02*** 5.02*** 5.02*** 5.02*** 5.02*** 4.92***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.08** 0.43*** 0.50*** 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.68***
(0.036) (0.078) (0.091) (0.068) (0.059) (0.058) (0.061)
CAFTA*US 0.04 0.14* 0.11 0.12* 0.09 0.26*** −0.01
(0.036) (0.078) (0.091) (0.068) (0.059) (0.058) (0.061)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 140 151 154 147 151 146 151
HS 41–43 BRaw Hides, Skins, Leather & Furs^
US 3.30*** 3.30*** 3.30*** 3.30*** 3.30*** 3.30*** 3.48***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.14 0.63*** 0.58*** 0.37*** 0.55*** 0.33*** 0.51***
(0.091) (0.073) (0.108) (0.083) (0.092) (0.100) (0.085)
CAFTA*US 0.09 0.32*** 0.58*** 0.90*** 0.44*** 0.80*** 0.32***
(0.091) (0.073) (0.108) (0.083) (0.092) (0.100) (0.085)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 70 80 88 81 73 83 80
HS 44–49 BWood & Wood Products^
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Table 17 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 5.16*** 5.16*** 5.16*** 5.16*** 5.16*** 5.16*** 5.26***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.08** 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.65*** 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.69***
(0.032) (0.071) (0.072) (0.068) (0.065) (0.061) (0.054)
CAFTA*US −0.10*** 0.03 0.08 0.12* 0.06 0.13** −0.20***
(0.032) (0.071) (0.072) (0.068) (0.065) (0.061) (0.054)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 137 148 149 144 144 149 148
HS 50–63 BTextiles^
US 4.29*** 4.29*** 4.29*** 4.29*** 4.29*** 4.29*** 4.56***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.04 0.35*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.44***
(0.060) (0.051) (0.078) (0.087) (0.074) (0.089) (0.070)
CAFTA*US −0.13** 0.12** 0.18** 0.33*** 0.14* 0.19** −0.17**
(0.060) (0.051) (0.078) (0.087) (0.074) (0.089) (0.070)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 97 113 112 108 109 110 113
HS 64–67 BFootwear / Headgear^
US 2.71*** 2.71*** 2.71*** 2.71*** 2.71*** 2.71*** 2.69***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.54*** 1.04*** 1.05*** 0.90*** 0.81*** 1.00*** 1.10***
(0.188) (0.179) (0.138) (0.155) (0.146) (0.166) (0.115)
CAFTA*US −0.31 0.45** 0.56*** 0.89*** 0.66*** 0.57*** 0.39***
(0.188) (0.179) (0.138) (0.155) (0.146) (0.166) (0.115)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 45 53 66 59 52 52 53
HS 68–71 BStone / Glass^
US 4.16*** 4.16*** 4.16*** 4.16*** 4.16*** 4.16*** 4.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.22*** 0.77*** 1.08*** 0.94*** 0.96*** 0.85*** 1.03***
(0.066) (0.074) (0.090) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.072)
CAFTA*US −0.14** 0.42*** 0.14 0.45*** 0.21*** 0.37*** 0.21***
(0.066) (0.074) (0.090) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.072)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 99 115 116 116 111 114 115
HS 72–83 BMetals^
US 5.01*** 5.01*** 5.01*** 5.01*** 5.01*** 5.01*** 4.89***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.13*** 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.79***
(0.042) (0.051) (0.058) (0.061) (0.069) (0.066) (0.046)
CAFTA*US −0.04 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.43*** −0.01
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Table 17 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
(0.042) (0.051) (0.058) (0.061) (0.069) (0.066) (0.046)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 127 131 135 140 141 139 131
HS 84–85 BMachinery / Electrical^
US 5.68*** 5.68*** 5.68*** 5.68*** 5.68*** 5.68*** 5.59***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.10*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.34*** 0.45***
(0.025) (0.046) (0.065) (0.051) (0.042) (0.047) (0.032)
CAFTA*US 0.01 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.35*** 0.22***
(0.025) (0.046) (0.065) (0.051) (0.042) (0.047) (0.032)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 167 179 172 178 173 177 179
HS 86–89 BTransportation^
US 4.01*** 4.01*** 4.01*** 4.01*** 4.01*** 4.01*** 3.72***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.12** 1.10*** 1.34*** 0.77*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 1.12***
(0.054) (0.240) (0.196) (0.104) (0.093) (0.118) (0.127)
CAFTA*US −0.27*** −0.20 −0.48** 0.27*** −0.12 0.12 −0.02
(0.054) (0.240) (0.196) (0.104) (0.093) (0.118) (0.127)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 72 93 97 90 83 84 93
HS 90–97 BMiscellaneous^
US 5.21*** 5.21*** 5.21*** . 5.21*** 5.21*** 5.30***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) . (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAFTA year 0.11** 0.56*** 0.65*** . 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.79***
(0.046) (0.040) (0.041) . (0.046) (0.042) (0.037)
CAFTA*US 0.00 0.21*** 0.18*** . 0.11** 0.26*** −0.15***
(0.046) (0.040) (0.041) . (0.046) (0.042) (0.037)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes . yes yes yes
Observations 137 151 158 . 156 156 151
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the interaction effect
between US market and CAFTA-DR dummies based on HS1 level regressions. The
coefficients are based on 15 different regression models each representing one industry as
defined by HS1. The figure lists the HS codes for the industries: 1–5 BAnimal & Animal
Products^, 6–15 BVegetable Products^, 16–24 BFoodstuffs^, 25–27 BMineral Products^
28–38 BChemicals^, 39–40 BPlastics / Rubbers^, 41–43 BRaw Hides, Skins, Leather &
Furs^, 44–49 BWood & Wood Products^, 50–63 BTextiles^, 64–67 BFootwear /
Headgear^, 68–71 BStone / Glass^, 72–83 BMetals^, 84–85 BMachinery / Electrical^,
86–89 BTransportation^, 90–97 B|Miscellaneous^.
Fig. 7 Effect of CAFTA-DR on US market by industry (HS1 level): number of new firms
Table 18 Linear fixed effects regression models - within firm number of new products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 0.34*** 1.05*** 1.15*** 0.65*** 1.25** 0.95** 0.34***
(0.023) (0.359) (0.094) (0.146) (0.506) (0.364) (0.018)
CAFTA year −0.13*** −0.17*** −0.26*** −0.23*** −0.33*** −0.32*** −0.27***
(0.044) (0.048) (0.046) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.034)
CAFTA*US 0.32*** 0.60*** 0.25*** 0.44*** 0.07* 0.02 0.32***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.045) (0.035)
Constant 1.28*** 0.58 0.72*** 1.23*** 0.61 0.91** 1.49***
(0.109) (0.393) (0.076) (0.087) (0.526) (0.370) (0.071)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 21,232 22,224 23,025 23,783 24,443 25,041 21,232
R2 0.32 0.40 0.31 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.30
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 19 Linear fixed effects regression models - within firm number of products by industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
HS 1–5 BAnimal & Animal Products^
US 5.95*** 4.61*** 2.25*** 2.52*** 2.92*** 2.32*** 0.95**
(1.899) (1.469) (0.629) (0.533) (0.596) (0.556) (0.398)
CAFTA year −0.16** −0.22** −0.28*** −0.33*** −0.36*** −0.33*** −0.27***
(0.064) (0.108) (0.099) (0.111) (0.099) (0.098) (0.079)
CAFTA*US 0.01 −0.42*** −0.49*** −0.15 −0.36*** −0.50*** −0.19**
(0.066) (0.111) (0.096) (0.111) (0.097) (0.098) (0.093)
Constant 0.58*** 1.61*** 2.44*** 2.84** 0.39 2.06** 1.13**
(0.032) (0.054) (0.847) (1.244) (0.938) (0.945) (0.546)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 842 856 872 889 906 906 906
R2 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.82
HS 6–15 BVegetable Products^
US 1.62*** 0.75** 1.55*** 1.86*** 2.71*** 2.17*** 1.72***
(0.333) (0.299) (0.571) (0.269) (0.925) (0.480) (0.521)
CAFTA YEAR −0.11*** −0.21*** −0.28*** −0.23*** −0.33*** −0.36*** −0.25***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034)
CAFTA*US −0.15*** −0.50*** −0.50*** −0.36*** −0.74*** −0.82*** −0.38***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.035)
Constant 4.74*** 5.66*** 4.82*** 4.61*** 3.55*** 4.12*** 3.81***
(0.394) (0.366) (0.600) (0.315) (0.957) (0.519) (0.502)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8857 9129 9424 9678 9875 9875 9875
R2 0.42 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.35
HS 16–24 BFoodstuffs^
US 1.67*** 1.68*** 0.35 0.39 1.68*** 1.63*** 0.61***
(0.324) (0.270) (0.337) (0.440) (0.162) (0.182) (0.187)
CAFTA YEAR −0.19*** −0.19*** −0.31*** −0.31*** −0.33*** −0.35*** −0.23***
(0.038) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.047) (0.035)
CAFTA*US 0.31*** −0.17*** −0.21*** −0.30*** −0.31*** −0.27*** −0.04
(0.040) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.038)
Constant 0.06 0.53 2.95*** 1.93*** 0.67*** 0.59*** 0.97***
(0.397) (0.360) (0.370) (0.470) (0.199) (0.221) (0.156)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2320 2425 2517 2593 2668 2668 2668
R2 0.45 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.50
HS: 25–27 BMineral Products^
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Table 19 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US −0.11 0.63*** −0.81*** 0.34* 1.39*** 0.28 0.36**
(0.175) (0.177) (0.291) (0.177) (0.215) (0.238) (0.143)
CAFTA YEAR −0.10** −0.20*** −0.30*** −0.28*** −0.30*** −0.28*** −0.50***
(0.044) (0.065) (0.063) (0.057) (0.053) (0.058) (0.132)
CAFTA*US 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.52***
(0.050) (0.069) (0.066) (0.062) (0.057) (0.059) (0.122)
Constant −0.07 0.20*** 1.30*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 1.33***
(0.195) (0.065) (0.063) (0.057) (0.053) (0.058) (0.132)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 440 466 480 501 510 510 510
R2 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.46 0.86
HS 28–38 BChemicals^
US 1.00*** 0.80** −0.05 1.17*** 1.21* 0.67* 0.67*
(0.147) (0.364) (0.393) (0.306) (0.664) (0.350) (0.365)
CAFTA YEAR −0.03 0.02 −0.09* −0.10** −0.13*** −0.18*** −0.11***
(0.043) (0.038) (0.051) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.040)
CAFTA*US 0.03 −0.14*** −0.11** −0.18*** 0.01 0.01 −0.02
(0.044) (0.040) (0.050) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043)
Constant −0.18 0.89 0.66 −0.33 −0.79 0.05 0.37
(0.173) (0.573) (0.414) (0.354) (0.670) (0.401) (0.343)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2338 2434 2532 2614 2699 2699 2699
R2 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.55
HS 39–40 BPlastics / Rubbers^
US 1.64*** 2.20* 1.38*** 1.79*** 2.03*** 1.45*** 2.77**
(0.334) (1.281) (0.297) (0.468) (0.412) (0.372) (1.157)
CAFTA YEAR −0.02 −0.09 −0.15** −0.17*** −0.17*** −0.14** −0.15***
(0.049) (0.068) (0.068) (0.058) (0.057) (0.062) (0.059)
CAFTA*US −0.02 0.17** 0.12 0.16** 0.22*** 0.18** 0.01
(0.054) (0.068) (0.071) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) (0.057)
Constant 0.68 1.56 2.95 −0.12 −0.00 0.74 −0.51
(0.521) (1.281) (2.332) (0.460) (0.252) (0.487) (0.756)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2977 3148 3306 3438 3568 3568 3568
R2 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.40
HS 41–43 BRaw Hides, Skins, Leather & Furs^
US 1.61*** 0.04 −1.64*** 0.01 2.50*** 1.43*** 3.03***
(0.435) (0.087) (0.227) (0.075) (0.317) (0.296) (0.832)
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Table 19 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
CAFTA YEAR 0.03 0.03 −0.06 −0.14* −0.13* −0.21** 0.06
(0.084) (0.088) (0.067) (0.075) (0.073) (0.092) (0.189)
CAFTA*US −0.01 −0.05 −0.13* −0.15** 0.03 −0.12 0.09
(0.088) (0.087) (0.070) (0.075) (0.077) (0.091) (0.157)
Constant −0.55 0.97*** 1.06*** 0.16 0.13* 0.21** 0.81***
(0.531) (0.088) (0.067) (0.269) (0.073) (0.092) (0.189)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 671 712 747 770 793 793 793
R2 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.48
HS 44–49 BWood & Wood Products^
US 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.92*** 0.71*** 1.57*** 0.52 1.56***
(0.152) (0.176) (0.113) (0.122) (0.192) (0.321) (0.256)
CAFTA YEAR 0.01 −0.03 −0.09** −0.17*** −0.19*** −0.20*** −0.15***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052)
CAFTA*US −0.01 0.03 0.02 0.09** 0.08 0.04 −0.10**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.040) (0.047) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050)
Constant 0.42** 1.71*** −0.62*** 1.06*** 0.19*** 1.20*** 0.65***
(0.200) (0.255) (0.167) (0.194) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3541 3730 3885 4006 4143 4143 4143
R2 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.43
HS 50–63 BTextiles^
US 4.58*** 9.76 3.83 7.37*** 5.87 6.00 2.05***
(0.829) (6.888) (5.250) (0.815) (4.036) (4.046) (0.589)
CAFTA YEAR −0.15 −0.13 −0.11 −0.21 −0.21 −0.28* −0.23**
(0.115) (0.151) (0.199) (0.152) (0.140) (0.155) (0.112)
CAFTA*US 0.13 −0.11 −0.29 −0.28* −0.43*** −0.50*** 0.05
(0.125) (0.145) (0.204) (0.166) (0.150) (0.167) (0.118)
Constant 0.15 1.13*** 4.00 0.21 −4.11 −2.56 0.31
(0.115) (0.151) (4.635) (0.152) (3.917) (3.828) (0.560)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1247 1314 1351 1394 1433 1433 1433
R2 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.47
HS 64–67 BFootwear / Headgear^
US 0.09 2.84*** −0.07 −0.02 −0.02 0.13 0.48
(0.162) (0.670) (0.154) (0.151) (0.167) (0.192) (0.385)
CAFTA YEAR 0.24 0.05 0.02 −0.00 0.08 0.07 0.52
(0.163) (0.181) (0.154) (0.154) (0.171) (0.195) (0.375)
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Table 19 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
CAFTA*US −0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.02 −0.13 −0.30
(0.162) (0.175) (0.154) (0.151) (0.167) (0.192) (0.385)
Constant 2.14*** −0.05 2.71*** −0.54* 0.48 0.60 1.33
(0.592) (0.181) (0.284) (0.273) (0.474) (0.396) (0.989)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 373 417 439 461 479 479 479
R2 0.26 0.45 0.47 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.51
HS 68–71 BStone / Glass^
US 3.61*** 1.42*** 1.51*** 2.81** 0.02 3.09*** 1.48***
(0.859) (0.300) (0.360) (1.175) (0.286) (0.780) (0.323)
CAFTA YEAR 0.23* 0.23* 0.22 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.13
(0.128) (0.125) (0.136) (0.120) (0.141) (0.146) (0.112)
CAFTA*US 0.11 −0.05 −0.10 −0.10 −0.01 0.02 −0.12
(0.129) (0.122) (0.130) (0.117) (0.142) (0.142) (0.115)
Constant −3.16*** 0.80*** −0.42 −1.29 4.52*** 1.74*** 2.79***
(0.694) (0.300) (0.335) (1.255) (0.325) (0.654) (0.446)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1052 1137 1212 1261 1322 1322 1322
R2 0.37 0.45 0.48 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.49
HS 72–83 BMetals^
US 2.95*** 2.88*** 0.51 0.82*** 0.95** 1.13* 0.51
(0.602) (0.738) (0.626) (0.053) (0.413) (0.627) (0.464)
CAFTA YEAR −0.01 −0.14 −0.20* −0.23*** −0.29*** −0.20** −0.17***
(0.081) (0.107) (0.104) (0.083) (0.082) (0.090) (0.060)
CAFTA*US 0.13 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.24** 0.07
(0.085) (0.099) (0.102) (0.092) (0.096) (0.105) (0.065)
Constant −1.53** −2.12*** 1.30** 3.49*** 1.52*** 1.26* 2.00***
(0.638) (0.731) (0.611) (0.343) (0.371) (0.639) (0.462)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2946 3104 3248 3354 3465 3465 3465
R-squared 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.40
HS 84–85 BMachinery / Electrical^
US 9.28*** 3.11*** 6.58*** 10.51*** 10.48*** 11.26*** 3.32***
(2.286) (0.317) (1.890) (2.146) (2.185) (1.926) (0.421)
CAFTA YEAR −0.10 −0.01 −0.11 −0.12 −0.19** −0.07 −0.11***
(0.080) (0.099) (0.122) (0.078) (0.090) (0.104) (0.033)
CAFTA*US 0.35*** 0.70*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.62*** 0.04
(0.088) (0.104) (0.121) (0.089) (0.103) (0.117) (0.034)
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Table 19 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
Constant −5.93** 0.35 −3.69** 0.12 1.19*** 0.07 0.78***
(2.287) (0.403) (1.596) (0.078) (0.090) (0.104) (0.033)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5507 5738 5971 6157 6340 6340 6340
R2 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.32
HS 86–89 BTransportation^
US 0.94*** 1.07*** 0.36 1.47*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 1.10***
(0.229) (0.146) (0.248) (0.335) (0.212) (0.240) (0.408)
CAFTA YEAR −0.12 −0.20** −0.17* −0.23** −0.23** −0.26** 0.03
(0.086) (0.082) (0.094) (0.089) (0.099) (0.101) (0.167)
CAFTA*US 0.15* 0.17** 0.19* 0.45*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.30*
(0.088) (0.080) (0.093) (0.095) (0.099) (0.106) (0.169)
Constant −0.03 0.20** 1.17*** 0.13 0.23** 0.26** 0.84***
(0.230) (0.082) (0.094) (0.388) (0.099) (0.101) (0.167)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 746 816 852 892 925 925 925
R2 0.53 0.40 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.49 0.55
HS 90–97 BMiscellaneous^
US 2.18*** 1.36** 0.99 0.84 8.10*** 1.12*** 2.50***
(0.340) (0.555) (0.661) (0.597) (0.129) (0.138) (0.045)
CAFTA YEAR 0.08 0.15* 0.06 −0.03 0.00 −0.03 −0.13**
(0.087) (0.086) (0.124) (0.099) (0.112) (0.115) (0.054)
CAFTA*US 0.17* 0.30*** 0.20 0.33*** 0.19 0.16 0.11*
(0.091) (0.088) (0.124) (0.109) (0.121) (0.127) (0.059)
Constant 0.24 1.51* 2.13** 2.91 0.28 7.18*** 0.87**
(0.424) (0.884) (0.983) (1.931) (1.315) (1.187) (0.361)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3422 3622 3811 3958 4083 4083 4083
R2 0.27 0.34 0.34 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.39
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 20 Linear fixed effects regression models – number of new products for small firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US −0.00 2.70*** −1.70*** −0.00 −0.00 2.74*** 0.00
(0.000) (0.786) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.378) (0.000)
CAFTA year −0.11 −0.17 −0.32*** 0.04 −0.17** −0.23** −0.57***
(0.104) (0.149) (0.078) (0.095) (0.083) (0.093) (0.065)
CAFTA*US 0.26*** 1.18*** 0.46*** 1.01*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.43***
(0.093) (0.097) (0.092) (0.104) (0.089) (0.107) (0.064)
Constant 2.72*** 3.53*** 10.94*** 1.29** 2.35*** 1.81** 2.20***
(0.572) (1.221) (2.220) (0.617) (0.414) (0.715) (0.546)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7620 7870 7631 7531 7406 7197 7620
R2 0.54 0.61 0.62 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.56
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 21 Linear fixed effects regression models – number of new product for big firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US −0.16*** −0.00 0.76*** 0.32* 0.25*** 0.20*** −0.30***
(0.036) (0.022) (0.122) (0.168) (0.020) (0.024) (0.037)
CAFTA YEAR −0.14*** −0.18*** −0.16*** −0.16*** −0.18*** −0.16*** −0.10***
(0.037) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.036) (0.030)
CAFTA*US 0.23*** 0.09** −0.18*** 0.01 −0.16*** −0.12*** 0.35***
(0.050) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.039) (0.047)
Constant 1.72*** 1.62*** 0.83*** 1.30*** 1.37*** 1.45*** 1.86***
(0.085) (0.101) (0.090) (0.192) (0.047) (0.047) (0.065)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 13,612 14,354 15,394 16,252 17,037 17,844 13,612
R2 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 22 Linear fixed effects regression models – number of new products conditional on product
differentiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 0.43*** −0.98*** −0.87*** −0.12*** −0.06** −0.10*** 0.47***
(0.013) (0.043) (0.110) (0.018) (0.028) (0.021) (0.011)
CAFTA_year −0.16*** −0.21*** −0.24*** −0.16*** −0.24*** −0.26*** −0.21***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.031) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
CAFTA*US 0.05 −0.03 −0.04 0.26*** 0.03 −0.01 0.03
(0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.032) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
CAFTA*dif prod 0.06 0.10*** 0.08*** −0.01 0.03 0.05* −0.00
(0.042) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023)
US*dif prod 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.02*
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
CAFTA*dif prod*US 0.04 0.20*** 0.12*** −0.23*** 0.02 0.06** 0.07***
(0.041) (0.021) (0.027) (0.031) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023)
Constant 0.04 1.47*** 1.44*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.68*** 0.15***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.112) (0.029) (0.022) (0.019) (0.024)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 42,215 45,502 48,091 50,343 52,285 54,099 42,215
R2 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 24 Linear fixed effects
regression models – number of
products conditional on product
differentiation including all years
2000–2014
Robust standard errors in paren-
theses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
(1)
US 0.12
(0.146)
CAFTA_year −1.13***
(0.029)
CAFTA*US −0.33***
(0.036)
CAFTA*dif prod 0.02
(0.055)
US*dif prod 0.06**
(0.023)
CAFTA*dif prod*US 0.33***
(0.056)
Constant 2.88***
(0.117)
Year fixed effects yes
Country fixed effects yes
Firm fixed effects yes
Observations 270,862
R2 0.12
Table 25 Linear fixed effects regression models – number of products conditional on product differentiation
including tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US 0.52*** 0.95*** 0.30* 0.49*** 0.58*** 1.04*** 0.93***
(0.031) (0.180) (0.151) (0.035) (0.040) (0.181) (0.030)
CAFTA_year −0.12* −0.23*** −0.26*** −0.14 −0.08 −0.15* −0.54***
(0.073) (0.080) (0.090) (0.098) (0.083) (0.084) (0.039)
CAFTA*US −0.04 −0.07 0.20** 0.29*** −0.31*** −0.08 0.03
(0.075) (0.089) (0.093) (0.076) (0.092) (0.083) (0.045)
CAFTA*dif prod 0.16 0.36*** 0.36** 0.22 0.13 0.43** −0.14*
(0.109) (0.122) (0.142) (0.200) (0.148) (0.197) (0.071)
US*dif prod 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.07**
(0.031) (0.042) (0.041) (0.035) (0.040) (0.051) (0.030)
CAFTA*dif prod*US −0.06 0.14 −0.27* 0.00 0.72*** −0.02 0.24**
(0.137) (0.145) (0.146) (0.170) (0.189) (0.252) (0.094)
Tariff −0.00 −0.01** −0.01** −0.01** −0.01*** −0.02** 0.01***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001)
Constant 1.78*** 1.35*** 1.93*** 1.82*** 1.80*** 1.31*** 2.97***
(0.199) (0.192) (0.212) (0.112) (0.144) (0.138) (0.110)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14,557 15,208 15,195 14,847 14,638 14,281 14,557
R2 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.59
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 26 Intensive margin with-
in firm trade volume (Poisson re-
gression) conditional on product
differentiation including all years
2000–2014
Robust standard errors in paren-
theses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
(1)
US 3.49***
(0.936)
CAFTA_year −1.31***
(0.211)
CAFTA*US 0.87***
(0.220)
CAFTA*dif prod 0.92***
(0.222)
US*dif prod 0.62***
(0.169)
CAFTA*dif prod*US −1.05***
(0.368)
Constant 2.64**
(1.097)
Year fixed effects yes
Country fixed effects yes
Firm fixed effects yes
Observations 229,709
R2 0.12
Table 27 Intensive margin within firm trade volume (Poisson regression) conditional on product differenti-
ation and including tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Averages
US −5.33*** 0.40 0.63 1.03 0.50 0.37 1.54***
(0.261) (0.425) (0.964) (1.024) (0.440) (0.421) (0.072)
CAFTA_year −0.66** −0.56** −0.27 −0.61** −0.42 −0.73** −0.12
(0.308) (0.256) (0.249) (0.288) (0.274) (0.292) (0.090)
CAFTA*US 0.47 1.00* 1.23*** 0.82* 1.13* 1.31*** 0.24
(0.478) (0.515) (0.475) (0.493) (0.640) (0.474) (0.146)
CAFTA*dif prod 1.05* 0.82* 0.50 0.65 0.74 0.82 −0.24**
(0.541) (0.423) (0.550) (0.586) (0.531) (0.568) (0.107)
US*dif prod 0.68 0.82* 0.77* 0.81* 0.75* 0.87* −0.15**
(0.444) (0.448) (0.455) (0.459) (0.457) (0.466) (0.072)
CAFTA*dif prod*US −1.76** −1.40 −2.10*** −0.93 −1.75* −2.17** −0.03
(0.763) (0.860) (0.805) (0.989) (0.991) (0.843) (0.176)
Tariff −0.05*** −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.00
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.003)
Constant 14.87*** 4.60*** 13.88*** 5.53*** 6.77*** 5.97*** 10.04***
(0.545) (1.453) (1.141) (1.012) (0.380) (1.009) (0.350)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12,591 13,037 12,992 12,675 12,518 12,341 12,341
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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